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The tension between the religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, guaranteeing the non-
establishment of religion and prohibiting the restriction of its 
free exercise, is clearest when secular courts are called upon 
to adjudicate the internal disputes of religious organizations. 
Such a dispute was at the heart of the 1929 case of Gonzalez 
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, in which the plaintiff 
alleged his right to be appointed to an ecclesiastical benefice in 
accordance with the terms of the canon law in force at the time 
of its erection rather than the more stringent provisions of the 
1917 Code of Canon Law then in force. A minor milestone in the 
development of principles for the resolution of church disputes 
1 Aspiring canonist that I am, it is my good fortune to have Father Adolfo Dacanáy, SJ, for 
a colleague.  He has been very generous in sharing with me his scholarly insights, his professional 
advice, and the contents of both his personal library and his humor.  Heeding not the better 
angels of my nature, nor my wife’s injunction against having more than one a month, I oblige him 
when he offers me a cigar.  I am grateful not only for his courtesy, but also for the opportunity it 
affords to converse with a leading canonist, and I greatly enjoy hearing Father Dacanáy’s stories 
from his long career in service to the Church.  This is especially true when he talks about the cases 
he has worked on—the harder, the better. I hope Father Dacanáy will find this article a fitting 
accompaniment to a fine cigar.
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by secular courts, Gonzalez’s greater significance lies in its sta-
tus as a forerunner of the ministerial exception, the legal doc-
trine which immunizes “religious entities from discrimination 
suits brought by employees with ‘ministerial’ responsibilities 
such as teaching religious doctrine or leading worship.”
Keywords: canon law; church property; church-state relations; 
legal history; religious corporations
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked that hard cases make for 
bad law.2 The statement oversimplifies the matter. First, no one can seriously 
doubt the converse, namely, that hard cases often arise because of bad laws.3 
Second, because they highlight the inherent tensions, limitations, and even 
defects of legislation and jurisprudence, hard cases perform a valuable service: 
they provide the opportunity for one to reflect upon and refine the legal order. 
Hard cases can make for good law as easily as bad. 
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila was a hard case, as are 
most cases in the field of church-state relations. At issue was the plaintiff ’s 
alleged right to be appointed to a chaplaincy in accordance with the terms 
of the canon law in force at the time of the chaplaincy’s erection rather than 
the more stringent provisions of the 1917 Code of Canon Law. Essentially 
a property dispute, Gonzalez had notable implications on the relationship 
between secular and religious judicatories, and is conspicuous for articulating 
the principle that “in the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness,” the 
former will regard the decisions of the latter as conclusive in cases where a civil 
right turns upon an ecclesiastical question.4 Still more significantly, Gonzalez 
is notable as a precursor to the ministerial exception, or the legal doctrine 
which “immunizes religious entities from discrimination suits brought by 
employees with ‘ministerial’ responsibilities such as teaching religious doctrine 
or leading worship.”5
2 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1909), 263–64.
4 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
5 Ian C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People (Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014), 57.
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We shall first situate Gonzalez within its proper historical context and 
introduce important legal concepts, then present the facts of the case and 
the decisions rendered therein by the Supreme Court of the Philippines and 




Described by Justice George A. Malcolm as “a most unusual case without 
a parallel in American or Spanish jurisprudence,” Gonzalez was unique not 
only because of its subject matter, but also because of the particular historical 
context in which it arose.6 Indeed, Gonzalez was a true product of its times, 
in the sense that it could never have arisen except where and when it did. 
It is necessary to consider the relative position of the Roman Catholic 
Church in the Philippines under the Spanish and American colonial regimes. 
Under the Spanish, the Church had enjoyed the status of an established 
religion.7 While civil and ecclesiastical authorities occasionally tried to insert 
themselves into one another’s affairs (often with disastrous results), the general 
relationship between the two was one of friendly collaboration. Indeed, 
secular authorities gave their ecclesiastical counterparts both direct and 
indirect assistance, paying the clergy’s salaries with public funds, conscripting 
natives to construct and repair church buildings, and permitting the religious 
orders to amass vast holdings in land, chattels, and coin.8 Though their assets 
were much smaller in comparison, dioceses, too, acquired substantial amounts 
of property through purchases or donations made for pious purposes. In such 
a system, the deference shown by the state to the decisions of ecclesiastical 
authorities would have prevented there being any serious doubts as to the 
6 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil. 420, 440 (1928) (J. Malcolm, 
concurring).
7 “Spain and Holy See: Concordat,” March 16, 1851, Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series 1221-II, no. 874 (1981): art. 1. 
8 Pedro S. de Achutegui, SJ, and Miguel A. Bernad, SJ, Religious Revolution in the Philippines: 
The Life and Church of Gregorio Aglipay, 4 vols. (Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 1960–72), 1:315, 319; 
Pablo Fernandez, History of the Catholic Church in the Philippines (1521–1898) (Manila: National 
Book Store, 1979), 98–107, 254–62; John N. Schumacher, “Church Lands and Philippine 
Socioeconomic Development,” Philippine Studies 25, no. 4 (1977): 457–59, 461–62; see “Spain 
and Holy See: Concordat,” arts. 31–36.
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status of a chaplaincy in civil law, the laws prescribing the qualifications of 
its ministers, or the persons competent to judge the suitability of candidates. 
A case like Gonzalez would never have gained traction.
The advent of American rule brought about seismic changes to the 
political and legal order, the most significant of which for our purposes being 
the separation of church and state. While the 1899 Malolos Constitution had 
also embraced this concept,9 the subsequent collapse of the First Philippine 
Republic meant that it was rather “the change to American sovereignty [which] 
caused the complete separation of church and state. All special privileges of 
the Roman Catholic Church were abolished. But the property of the Church 
was protected since in the [1898] Treaty of Paris it was declared that the 
relinquishment or cession of the Philippine Islands ‘cannot in any respect 
impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession 
of property of all kinds . . . of ecclesiastical or civil bodies.’”10 
The recognition of earlier Spanish ecclesiastical laws implied in this clause 
produced a strange situation in which the Roman Catholic Church itself 
was regarded as having juridic personality in the colony while lacking this 
status on the mainland.11 Characterized at the time by the American jurist 
Carl Zollmann as “a Spanish product, thrust upon us by the Treaty of Paris 
and ill-suited to our conditions,” the fact that this situation had not been 
foreseen during the treaty ratification process makes it a typical example of the 
awkwardness and confusion which attended the regime’s attempts at finding 
a modus vivendi between its legal traditions and those of its new subjects.12
Compounding this already difficult task was the fact that American civil 
church law of the period was not entirely settled on questions such as the 
proper relationship between civil and religious judicatories. While we shall 
explore the contributions of Gonzalez on this subject below, we would do 
well to state here an observation which factors into this discussion, namely, 
that the case stands within a broader movement in American jurisprudence, 
tending away from the resolution of church disputes through the use of more 
9 Malolos Constitution, January 20, 1899, arts. 5, 100, Official Gazette, http://www.gov.ph/
constitutions/the-1899-malolos-constitution; see Achutegui and Bernad, 1:60–64.
10 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 442 (J. Malcolm, concurring); see “A Treaty of Peace between 
the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain,” December 10, 1898, U.S. Statutes at 
Large 30 (1897–99): art. VIII.
11 Carl Zollmann, American Civil Church Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1917), 47–48.
12 See Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 41 (1907); Evangelista v. Ver, 8 Phil. 653 (1908); Achutegui 
and Bernad, 1:313–48.
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intrusive techniques which entangled secular courts in questions of religious 
doctrine and toward more deferential alternatives more amenable to a healthy 
separation of church and state. Given the trajectory of this movement, it is 
possible that even if Gonzalez had never arisen, American (or, after 1946, 
Philippine) jurisprudence would have eventually established the precedents 
necessary for resolving such a case. How long this would have taken is a matter 
of speculation, though if the actual course of history serves as any indication, 
it may have been at least another thirty years.13
Legal Context14
Besides historical details, an adequate understanding of Gonzalez requires 
some familiarity with basic concepts of secular and canon law, especially as 
articulated in the 1917 Code of Canon Law.15 Significant for our purposes 
are the legal concepts of personality and property, as well as the system of 
ecclesiastical benefices. 
We begin with personality. Legally, a person is a subject  with rights and 
obligations.16 Several classifications of persons exist, the most fundamental of 
which is the distinction between physical and juridic persons.17 To illustrate, 
Cardinal Luis Tagle is a physical person, while the canonical entity called the 
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Manila and its civil alter ego, the Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, are juridic persons under his direction.18 
Canonical and civil concepts of juridic personality substantially agree on 
several points, including that juridic persons are constituted through the 
exercise of legislative or administrative authority, at least in principle;19 that 
they are constituted to pursue a proper purpose in the furtherance of either 
13 This estimate is based on the date of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696 (1976), which was the next noteworthy case dealing with the qualifications of 
ecclesiastical officers and the civil effects of church polity.
14 The section on property is adapted from Joseph B. Johnson and Marco Ventura, “The 
Organization of Roman Catholic Church Property as Trusts in American Law” (unpublished 
manuscript, 2015).
15 Codex Iuris Canonici Pii X Pontificis Maximi iussu digestus Benedicti Papae XV auctoritate 
promulgatus (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1917), hereinafter, CIC 1917.
16 Codex Iuris Canonici auctoritate Ioannis Pauli PP. II promulgatus (Vatican City: Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, 1983), cc. 96; 113 §2, hereinafter, CIC 1983.
17 CIC 1917, c. 99.
18 CIC 1917, c. 1519 §1; cf. CIC 1983, cc. 118; 1279 §1.
19 CIC 1917, cc. 99; 100, §1; CIC 1983, cc. 113 §1; 114, §1; 116; Zollmann, 65–74; 
Corporation Code of Philippines, Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (1980), secs. 2, 4, hereinafter, CCP 1980.
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the public good or a private good, in accordance with the norm of law and 
their own statutes;20 that they have the same powers as a physical person to 
do those things necessary or convenient to pursue their proper purposes, 
including the capacities to acquire, retain, administer, and alienate property, 
to enact bylaws, and to sue and be sued;21 and that they are in principle 
perpetual, though they may be constituted only for a definite period of time, 
or altered or suppressed on the initiative of competent authority, or become 
extinct through protracted inactivity.22
Despite these similarities, the separation of church and state in the 
American constitutional settlement entails important differences for the 
status and powers of juridic persons active in both the canonical and civil 
spheres. To take one example, canon law regards dioceses or parishes as public 
juridic persons and invests their directors with governmental, even coercive, 
authority; the civil law, however, regards such entities as merely private in 
nature, ascribing to their directors a much narrower range of powers.23 Indeed, 
the dominant view in American jurisprudence has been to regard civilly 
incorporated religious entities as a species of voluntary associations, not 
fundamentally dissimilar from any other corporation organized for charitable 
or benevolent purposes.24 Positively, this view means that civil courts will 
often defer to the rules, policies, and decisions instituted by the directors 
of religious entities or their hierarchical superiors. Negatively, it also entails 
that civil courts claim the competence to overrule the aforesaid in cases of 
conflict with the civil law.25 Since canon law does not necessarily concede this 
competence to the civil authority, differences between the canonical and civil 
20 CIC 1917, cc. 99; 100, §1; CIC 1983, cc. 114, 116; Zollmann, 106–9.
21 CIC 1917, cc. 13, §2; 335–36; 1495–96; 1522, §2; 1526; CIC 1983, cc. 12 §3; 118; 
391–92; 1254–55; 1400 §1, 1°; cf. c. 1288; CCP 1980, secs. 36; 46–48; cf. sec. 45.
22 CIC 1917, cc. 100, §1; 102; 215, §1; 216, §1; 1500; CIC 1983, cc. 120–22; CCP 1980, 
secs. 2; 11; 76–80; 117–22; Zollmann, 71–74; see CIC 1983, cc. 373; 449 §1; 515 §2.
23 Coughlin, 129–37; Kauper and Ellis, 1505; Zollmann, 64–80. John J. Coughlin, Canon 
Law: A Comparative Study with Anglo-American Legal Theory (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 129–37; Paul G. Kauper and Stephen C. Ellis. “Religious Corporations 
and the Law,” Michigan Law Review 71, no. 8 (1973): 1505; Zollmann, 64–80.
24 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714, 725, 728-729 (1871). 
25 Wisconsin statutory law on Roman Catholic religious corporations (Wis. Stats. 187.19[6]) 
illustrates this principle:  “The directors, by unanimous vote, may adopt such bylaws, not contrary 
to the constitution and laws of this state, the statutes of the diocese and the discipline of the Roman 
Catholic church, as may be deemed necessary for the proper government of such corporation and 
the management and business thereof or the temporal affairs of such congregation which may 
become connected therewith or attached thereto . . .”
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status of juridic persons have considerable potential as a source of internal 
church disputes, the resolution of which depends on the degree of deference 
civil authorities will show to the decisions of their ecclesiastical counterparts. 
In the common law tradition, property is a legally protected expectation 
deriving certain advantages from a thing, whether land or the fixtures situated 
thereupon (realty), chattels (personalty), stock, or other goods, whether 
tangible or intangible.26 Seen in a different perspective, property consists 
of the legal relationships between persons with respect to things. Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld articulated what has since become the dominant position 
among American legal scholars, identifying four basic legal relations and 
organizing them as corollary pairs: right-duty, privilege-absence of right, 
power-liability, and immunity-disability.27 Any individual right, privilege, 
power, or immunity, or any aggregate thereof, is called an interest; the totality 
of interests which it is legally possible to have with respect to a thing, except 
those accruing to a person in virtue of his or her standing as a member of 
society, is called complete property or full ownership.28 
Complete property with respect to realty is called an estate in fee simple 
absolute. Characterized by hereditability and devisability, the fee simple 
absolute is distinguished from the related but lesser form of ownership known 
as fee simple defeasible by its being subject to no conditions providing for its 
termination upon the cessation of some state of affairs or the occurrence 
of some event, and thus, theoretically perpetual in duration.29 That this 
arrangement entails a high degree of control over the disposition of the 
estate made the fee simple absolute the preferred method of holding church 
property for the American bishops of the nineteenth century.30 Still, it was 
not unknown for bishops to accept deeds specifying conditions of defeasance, 
providing, for example, that the realty being conveyed would revert to its 
donors if ever it ceased to be used for the benefit of a certain congregation, 
26 Roger A. Cunningham, William B. Stoebuck, and Dale A. Whitman, eds. The Law of 
Property, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1993), 1, 3.
27 Cunningham, Stoebuck and Whitman, 3–4; see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Yale Law Journal 23, no. 1 
(1913–14): 16–59.
28 Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman, 4–7.
29 Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman, 29, 35.
30 First Provincial Council of Baltimore (1829), decree 5, in Concilia Provinciali Baltimora 
habita ab anno 1829 usque ad annum 1849 (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1851), 74; Joseph B. 
Johnson, “Ownership of Roman Catholic Church Property in Wisconsin (1829-1899)” (master’s 
thesis, KU Leuven, 2014), 32–37.
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or as a burial ground, and so on. This practice was more common in the 
Philippines, where the system of benefices was better established than in 
the United States and the bishops were more accustomed to receiving large 
bequests conditioned upon the performance of some service, such as the 
offering of Masses for a given intention.
To qualify some property interests as “complete” is implicitly to 
acknowledge that others may be “incomplete.” This distinction represents 
a difference in the conventional understandings of ownership found in the 
civil law tradition, which conceives it as being more or less unitary, and the 
common law tradition, which conceives it as being divisible, foreseeing the 
possibility of several persons having quantitatively and qualitatively different 
interests in the same thing. Thus it may happen that one or several persons 
hold legal title to a given thing—that is, the bundle of rights such as exclusive 
use, possession, enclosure, conveyance, and hypothecation, giving them 
the use, management, and enjoyment of the thing—while one or several 
different persons hold equitable title—that is, a beneficial interest, or a right in 
expectancy in something, with the right to acquire formal legal title thereto.31 
This is the situation with trusts.
Defined as “a property interest held by one person32 (the trustee) at the 
request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary),” 
a trust, for it to be valid, requires that it involve specific property, reflect the 
settlor’s intent, and be created for a lawful purpose.33 American jurisprudence 
recognizes a wide range of lawful purposes for which a trust may be established, 
not excluding the promotion of a particular set of religious doctrines or the 
offering of prayers.34 Where the settlor’s intent is manifest, as when it is stated 
explicitly in a will or some other legal instrument establishing the trust, it 
is express; where it must be inferred from other evidence, as when the trust 
property has been donated by many individuals cooperating informally, it is 
implied. Although American law highly esteems the settlor’s original intention, 
privileging it over attempts to divert trust property to other purposes, if ever 
it becomes impossible, impractical, or illegal to pursue this intention, such 
a diversion may be authorized under the cy-prés doctrine, by which “a court 
reforms a written instrument with a gift to charity as closely to the donor’s 
31 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009), s.vv. “Interest,” “Ownership,” “Title.”
32 It is possible to have multiple trustees, who may or may not possess corporate personality.
33 Black’s Law Dictionary, s.v. “Trust.”
34 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 433–434.
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intention as possible, so that the gift does not fail.”35 Canon law operates on 
similar principles, but establishes narrower conditions for diverting property 
given for one purpose to the service of another.36
As a last point, we should note that canon law conceives ownership as 
being divisible, not unlike the common law tradition. Over time, ownership 
(termed dominium) came to be used interchangeably with the term proprietas, 
indicating partial, divided interests.37 That the canonical concept of ownership 
is seen in this latter sense is clear from the hierarchical nature of the Church. 
To illustrate, the pastor of a parish exercises dominium over the parochial 
property, but is subject in this to the oversight and direction (imperium) of 
the diocesan bishop, who may intervene in the pastor’s administration of 
this property in cases of abuse, neglect, or incompetence. Using secular legal 
vocabulary, canon law can be said to regard the pastor and bishop as trustees 
holding legal title to the parochial property, in trust for the use and benefit 
of the Christian faithful, in accordance with the intent of the donors. This 
analysis also applies to other ecclesiastical juridic persons, such as benefices, 
which we come now to discuss.
Deriving its name from the Latin beneficium, or “benefit,” an ecclesiastical 
benefice is a juridic entity constituted or erected in perpetuity by a competent 
ecclesiastical authority and consisting of a sacred office and the right of 
receiving incomes from the endowment connected to that office.38 Various 
classifications of benefices existed under the 1917 Code of Canon Law, which 
distinguished them as consistorial or non-consistorial, depending on whether 
they were conferred in consistory or not; secular or religious, depending on 
whether they could be claimed by secular or religious clergy; residential or 
non-residential, depending on whether they entailed the obligation of residence 
or not; amovable or inamovable, depending on whether their incumbent could 
be removed at the will of the appointing authority or not; and those involving 
the care of souls versus those which did not.39  A further classification not 
explicitly mentioned in the 1917 Code concerned the means of appointing 
35 Black’s Law Dictionary, s.v. “Cy Pres.”
36 CIC 1917, cc. 829; 836; 1523, 2°; 1551; cf. c. 843; CIC 1983, cc. 949; 954; 1284, §2, 3°; 
1308–10; cf. c. 958.
37 See CIC 1983, cc. 1256: “Dominium bonorum, sub suprema auctoritis Romani Pontificis, 
ad eam pertinet iuridicam personam, quae eadem bona legitime acquisiverit;” 1284, §2, 2°: 
“Exinde debent curare ut proprietas bonorum ecclesiasticorum modis civiliter validis in tuto 
ponatur” (emphasis added).
38 CIC 1917, c. 1409.
39 CIC 1917, c. 1411; cf. c. 1438.
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the incumbent, namely, that a benefice was said to be elective if the right of 
nominating and presenting a candidate fell to an electoral body; presentative, 
if it devolved upon a patron; or collative, if the appointing authority could 
appoint freely.40 
Specific kinds of benefices also existed within these genera. Of particular 
significance for our purposes is the chaplaincy. Defined as “an institution 
founded by an individual for the purpose of celebrating or causing to be 
celebrated annually a certain number of Masses conforming to the will of the 
founder,” chaplaincies were distinguished as ecclesiastical or lay, depending on 
whether or not they were erected by the decree of the competent ecclesiastical 
authority, such as a diocesan bishop.41 The intervention of this authority was 
of decisive importance for the canonical status of a chaplaincy: with it, the 
chaplaincy enjoyed canonical juridic personality and was considered a benefice 
in the proper sense, entailing for the diocesan bishop the right of appointing or 
confirming candidates for the office, and for these candidates, the requirement 
that they possess a title of ordination in order to attain the office; without 
it, the chaplaincy lacked personality and was thus subject to a lesser degree 
of ecclesiastical control, entailing for the diocesan bishop merely the right of 
visitation, and for candidates, that no title of ordination was necessary for 
their appointment.42 
It had been possible since the Council of Trent to confer non-residential 
benefices such as chaplaincies only upon clerics in their fourteenth year or 
above—that is, aged at least thirteen years and one day. 43 Apart from this, 
the canon law of the time prescribed no other qualifications. The 1917 Code, 
however, indirectly raised the minimum age for appointment to chaplaincies 
by prescribing that no one was to be admitted to first tonsure (and thus, the 
clerical state) unless he had begun the course of theology, and that no one 
was to be admitted to the course of theology unless he had completed the 
two year course in rational philosophy and its allied disciplines.44 In effect, 
40 Catholic Encyclopedia (1907–12), s.v. “Benefice;” see CIC 1917, c. 1452; 1455, 1°; 1465, 
§1; 1471.
41 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1, 10, note 1, citing Catholic Encyclopedia (1907–12), s.v. “Chaplain.” 
Ecclesiastical chaplaincies were also called “collative,” since their subjection to the authority of the 
diocesan bishop entailed for him the right of appointing the incumbent.
42 CIC 1917, cc. 1412, 2°; 1474; see Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 453–54 (J. Johns, dissenting).
43 Council of Trent, Session 23, July 15, 1563, Decreta super reformatione, c. 6; Norman P. 
Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 2 vols. (London and Washington, DC: Sheed and 
Ward and Georgetown University Press, 1990), 2:747.
44 CIC 1917, cc. 108, §1; 976, §1; 1365, §§1-2; see cc. 1442.
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this would have meant that no one could be appointed to a benefice until 
about his twentieth year. The 1917 Code moreover invested the ordinary with 
the authority to judge the qualifications of candidates for ordination as well 
appointment to chaplaincies or other benefices.45
A word is in order concerning interests in benefices. Here it must be said 
that the incumbents of benefices did not own them in an absolute sense, either 
in civil or in canon law. Civil law considered benefices such as chaplaincies to 
be a form of trust in which the diocesan bishop, as trustee, held legal title to the 
property comprising the chaplaincy’s endowment at the request of its donor, 
the settlor, in accordance with his or her will and for a lawful purpose, such as 
the offering of Masses for a certain intention. The incumbent would thus be 
the beneficiary of this trust, having an equitable interest therein. Describing 
a benefice in this way does not substantially contradict the understanding 
of canon law, wherein incumbents were recognized as having the status of 
guardians or curators, who were bound to administer the endowment in such 
a way as to preserve it as a steady source of income for their successors and 
subject to the oversight and authority of the diocesan bishop.46 
Incumbents enjoyed a conditional right to the usufruct of their benefices, 
and were entitled under the 1917 Code only to an income sufficient for their 
honest support, subject to the obligation of applying any excess funds to 
pious causes and works of charity.47 The Code further conditioned the right 
of receiving incomes upon the performance of a spiritual function, such 
as offering Masses and especially the daily recitation of the Divine Office. 
Incumbents who failed to perform these duties without a legitimate excuse 
forfeited their incomes in proportion to the gravity of the omission, these 
funds then being applied toward the maintenance of the benefice, the support 
of the diocesan seminary, or distributed among the poor.48 If a benefice lay 
vacant, the Code provided that half of its incomes were to be added to its 
endowment and half applied toward its maintenance, except where there 
existed a legitimate custom of using the entire income for the common good 
of the diocese.49 
Having situated the case within its proper historical context and 
introduced the relevant legal concepts, we now turn to briefly summarize 
45 CIC 1917, cc. 968, §1; 1464.
46 CIC 1917, cc. 1415; 1476; 1478; 1519; 1523–24.
47 CIC 1917, c. 1473; CIC 1983, c. 282, §2.
48 CIC 1917, c. 1475.
49 CIC 1917, c. 1481.
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the case history of Gonzalez, the arguments of the parties, and the decisions 
rendered by the courts.
GONZALEZ V. ROMAN CATHOLIC 
ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA
On March 13, 1816, Doña Petronila de Guzman executed a will providing 
for the disposition of her estate and expressing her intention that certain of her 
properties50 in the Calle Rosario (the current Quintin Paredes Road) should 
be erected as a collative chaplaincy under the patronage of the Father President 
of the College of San Juan de Letran, with her grandson and executor, Jose 
Telesforo de Guzman, serving as administrator during the minority of her 
great-grandson, Esteban de Guzman, who she named as the first chaplain.51 
The chaplaincy was subject to an obligation of sixty Masses per year, to be 
said in the churches of Manila or those outside its walls, for the repose of the 
testatrix’s soul and the souls of her parents and siblings.52 Funding for these 
Masses was to come from rents collected on the chaplaincy properties, then 
totaling ₱180 per year; incomes over and above the amount necessary to satisfy 
the obligation of sixty Masses per year were to be paid to the incumbent.53 
After the death of the testatrix, her executor petitioned the Archbishop of 
Manila on April 24, 1820, to erect the chaplaincy in accordance with her 
wishes and executed a formal document of endowment on April 26, 1820, 
reading in part as follows:
[The executor] segregates the said property from temporal properties and 
transfers it to the spiritual properties of this Archbishopric, with the restriction 
that, as spiritual  property, it cannot be alienated or converted into 
any other estate for any cause, even  though of a more pious character, 
(the grantor) protesting that if the contrary should be done from now until 
then, he declares null and without value or effect whatever may be done or 
executed contrary to the tenor of these presents, and the said executor affirms 
and ratifies said conditions . . . so that by virtue of this Deed of Foundation 
canonical collation may be conferred on the said appointed chaplain. And for 
50 The said properties consisted of lots 210–12 and 214, and a house of lime and stone 
situated thereupon, built at a cost of ₱1,600; Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 423–25.
51 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 422–23.
52 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 422–23.
53 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 427.
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its stability and greater validity he renounces with all solemnity the laws that 
may favor the said decedent, inserting and repeating herein all the clauses that 
may be necessary with all the requisites and conditions, so that the purpose 
which actuated her to do this act of piety may be duly accomplished . . .54
Upon the recommendation of the archdiocesan procurator f iscal, the 
Archbishop of Manila issued an appropriate decree of erection, constituting 
the chaplaincy as a benefice, subject to the specified conditions and making it, 
“by perpetual title, to be of the ecclesiastical forum and jurisdiction.”55 From 
about 1863, the Archbishop of Manila assumed the administration of the 
chaplaincy during vacancies, charging a commission for this service whenever 
a chaplain was in office.56 In 1914, the Archbishop of Manila acquired a 
Torrens title in fee simple for the chaplaincy property.57 
Five men held the chaplaincy between 1820 and 1910, all of them 
descendants of the foundress and aged more than 13, 21, 22, 27, and 19 
years at the time of their respective appointments.58 On December 6, 1910, 
the last incumbent, Angel Gonzalez, resigned the chaplaincy in order to marry 
his wife, Adelaida.59 The Archbishop of Manila assumed the administration 
of the chaplaincy during the ensuing vacancy, collecting incomes from 
the chaplaincy property and applying any balances in excess of the costs 
of administration and of offering the obligatory sixty Masses annually to 
educational, benevolent, and charitable purposes.60 
On September 16, 1912, Adelaida Gonzalez gave birth to a son, Raul 
Rogerio.61 In 1922, when the boy was not yet in his eleventh year, he was 
presented for appointment to the chaplaincy. The Archbishop of Manila, 
Michael O’Doherty, rejected this request on the basis of Gonzalez’s youth and 
lack of other suitable qualifications enumerated in the 1917 Code of Canon 
Law; at the same moment, he offered at his expense to educate the boy in 
preparation for appointment to the chaplaincy at a later date, adding that he 
54 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 425.
55 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 426.
56 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 427–28.
57 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 427–28.
58 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 426; 454–55 (J. Johns, dissenting).  The chaplains were Esteban 
de Guzman; Vincente de Guzman (appointed April 7, 1838); Mariano de Guzman (appointed 
October 11, 1867); Fernando Maniquis (appointed May 23, 1890); and Angel Gonzalez 
(appointed June 20, 1901).
59 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 12.
60 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 428.
61 Raul Rogerio Gonzalez shall hereinafter be referred to as Gonzalez.
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made this offer in recognition of the fact that Gonzalez was the nearest living 
relative of the foundress.62 
Litigation in the Philippine Courts
Failing to resolve the impasse to her satisfaction and seeking to recover 
the incomes from the chaplaincy during its protracted vacancy, Adelaida 
Gonzalez, acting as guardian ad litem for her son, brought an action against 
the Archbishop of Manila before the Court of First Instance in Manila on July 
31, 1924.63 While the parties generally agreed on the facts of the case, they 
differed in their interpretations. Gonzalez argued, first, that the Archbishop 
of Manila held an empty legal title to the chaplaincy property, in trust for the 
exclusive benefit of the settlor’s descendants; second, that he, as her next of 
kin, was entitled to be appointed as chaplain, irrespective of his ecclesiastical 
qualifications or lack thereof; and third, that he, having equitable title to the 
chaplaincy property, was entitled both to its future incomes for as long as 
he should hold the office of chaplain, as well as those which had accrued to 
the chaplaincy since it became vacant in 1910—two years before his birth.64 
Against this, the Archbishop of Manila maintained, first, that the transfer 
of the chaplaincy property to his predecessor in 1820 “had the effect of 
conveying it to the Archbishop, as representative of the Church, in whom, 
upon his acceptance of the same, the entire property became vested, for 
the purpose of maintaining the chaplaincy in question”; second, that the 
chaplaincy was constituted as an ecclesiastical benefice by the decree of the 
Archbishop, who enjoyed the sole right of appointing its incumbent; third, 
that the canon law of the Catholic Church supported this right while also 
prescribing the necessary qualifications for chaplains, which Gonzalez lacked; 
fourth, that the Archbishop, as owner of the chaplaincy property, was free 
during vacancies in the chaplaincy to dispose of its income as he saw fit, 
provided that the requisite number of Masses were offered in accordance 
with the will of the foundress; fifth, that the incumbent of the chaplaincy 
was entitled, during his incumbency only and subject to his performance of 
the sacred functions specified in its decree of erection, to an income sufficient 
62 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 429.
63 Since Gonzalez was not yet in his thirteenth year by that date, the Archbishop of Manila 
maintained, as before, that he was canonically unqualified for appointment by reason of his age; 
this led to the filing of an amended complaint on April 5, 1926, when the boy was in his fifteenth 
year and thus no longer subject to this disqualification; see Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 431.
64 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 431–32.
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only for his decent support; and sixth, that secular courts lack the necessary 
jurisdiction to compel ecclesiastical authorities to perform merely ecclesiastical 
functions, such as appointing a person to a benefice.65 
The central questions in the dispute may be distilled from the foregoing, 
namely, whether Gonzalez had a legal right to be appointed chaplain, and 
whether he was entitled to recover the incomes collected from the chaplaincy 
property during its vacancy, less the costs of administration and of satisfying 
the obligation of sixty Masses annually.66
Rejecting the Archbishop’s contention that the secular courts lacked 
jurisdiction in the controversy, the Court of First Instance asserted its 
competency over what it considered as being fundamentally a question of 
civil property rights rather than the application of ecclesiastical law. As the 
chaplaincy had been erected pursuant to a will, through a civil contract with 
the character of a trust, the Court reasoned that the case should be judged 
with reference to the general doctrines of equity and the civil law on contracts. 
Citing the principle that wills are governed by the law existing at the time of 
their execution, and the provision of the Organic Act of 1916 establishing that 
“no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted,”67 the Court 
held that the application of the ecclesiastical qualifications specified in the 
1917 Code of Canon Law to a candidate seeking appointment to a benefice 
established in 1820 would be to retroactively alter the terms of the trust’s 
foundation. This would in turn “impair the obligation of the trust involved 
in the acceptance of the provision of [the settlor’s] will for the establishment 
of the chaplaincy, and it would impair the obligation of a contract in violation 
of the Organic Act.”68 Ruling in favor of Gonzalez, the Court ordered the 
Archbishop of Manila to appoint him as chaplain and pay him the sum of 
₱173,720,69 this amount representing the aggregate incomes collected from 
the chaplaincy property since it fell vacant in 1910, less the cost of the sixty 
Masses offered annually during that period.70 
The Archbishop of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines, which rendered its decision on February 4, 1928. Writing for the 
65 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 432–33.
66 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 11.
67 An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the Future Political Status 
of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous Government for Those 
Islands, sec. 3, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (August 29, 1916), U.S. Statutes at Large 39 (1915–17): 546.
68 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 444–45 (J. Malcolm, concurring).
69 $86,862.50 (1929 USD), or about $1,200,000 (2015 USD) /₱55,200,000 (2015 PHP).
70 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 452 (J. Johns, dissenting); Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 11.
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majority, Justice Thomas A. Street began by responding to the Archbishop’s 
objection that the controversy was not subject to the jurisdiction of the secular 
courts because of its ecclesiastical nature. Rejecting this argument, he noted 
that the case revolved around a question of property rights connected with the 
execution of a trust in which Gonzalez claimed to have an equitable interest.71 
There could be no serious doubt concerning the competence of the courts 
to resolve such a question, nor concerning their duty to see that property 
impressed with a trust is not diverted to other uses, as Gonzalez alleged 
the Archbishop had done. Still, the religious dimension of the case was not 
negligible, but rather obliged the courts to depart from the general doctrines 
of equity and judge the case in accordance with jurisprudential principles 
dealing with rights derived from ecclesiastical sources.72
Finding no precedents in Spanish, English, or American law for 
compelling an ecclesiastical authority to appoint a person to a chaplaincy 
or any other benefice—“a sinister omen for the plaintiff ’s case,” in Street’s 
words—the Supreme Court of the Philippines instead had recourse to the 
rule articulated in the 1843 case of Harmon v. Dreher: “Where a civil right 
depends upon an ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil court, and not the 
ecclesiastical, which is to decide. The civil tribunal tries the civil right, and 
no more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions, out of which the right arises, as 
it finds them.”73 In application, this meant that secular courts would accept 
the decisions of religious judicatories as absolutely conclusive in cases where 
such decisions had bearing upon civil rights, such as interests in property 
organized as a trust for religious purposes. This entailed that it belonged to 
secular courts to determine who had a civil right to the property in question, 
on the basis of criteria established by ecclesiastical authority; or again, in 
coming to their determination, secular courts could investigate whether the 
competent ecclesiastical authority had applied its own criteria correctly, but 
could not pass upon the rightness or wrongness of the criteria themselves.
In light of this consideration, the Supreme Court of the Philippines 
held that “the trial court erred in not accepting as conclusive the decision 
of the Archbishop in regard to the question whether or not the plaintiff 
is ecclesiastically qualified to be appointed chaplain.”74 It further erred in 
concluding that the canon law in force at the time of the chaplaincy’s erection 
71 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 433.
72 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 434.
73 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 434–36; Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C.Eq. 87 (1843).
74 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 436. 
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and not the 1917 Code of Canon Law determined the necessary qualifications 
of incumbents. Gonzalez had argued that to give effect to the provisions of 
the 1917 Code would be to retroactively alter the terms of the trust. The 
Court rejected this claim, with Street remarking that the relevant canons were 
“general in terms and evidently intended to be applicable to all chaplains to 
be appointed in the future . . . . If the Church had attempted to make the 
ordinance applicable to chaplains already appointed, thereby depriving them 
of an office as to which title had previously been acquired, the effect would be 
to make the statute truly retroactive. But such is not the case before us now.”75 
Street also responded to the apparent belief of the trial court that the 
application of the more stringent ecclesiastical qualifications prescribed 
in the 1917 Code would impair the obligation of the trust in violation of 
the Organic Act of 1916. Dismissing this idea as fallacious, he submitted 
that a canon altering the qualifications for appointment to a chaplaincy 
could have been enacted under Spanish rule, hence “it cannot be admitted 
that an obligation which could be changed under Spanish law has become 
immutable from the promulgation [of the Organic Act] . . . . Perpetuities 
of any sort are objectionable, but one of this character would be intolerable. 
As is justly said by the attorney for the appellant, ‘It is unthinkable that the 
qualifications for chaplains should remain stagnant and the same forever.’”76 
Justice Charles A. Johns criticized this reasoning in his dissent, remarking that 
when the 1917 Code was instituted, “this country was no longer under the 
dominion of Spain, and that it was then under the laws of the United States 
in which neither the church nor the state can enact a law which will impair 
the obligation of a contract.”77 
Concurring with the majority, Justice George A. Malcolm offered perhaps 
the best analysis. Remarking that the chaplaincy had indeed been erected 
pursuant to a will, through a civil contract with the character of a trust, 
and that the law applicable at the time of its erection should thus govern in 
principle, Malcolm noted that the executor of the will had renounced all laws 
which might favor the foundress.78 The fact that the foundress herself had 
expressed her intent to establish a collative rather than a lay chaplaincy tended 
to support the conclusion that she had intended for the chaplaincy, like all 
others of its kind, to be subject to ecclesiastical authority and administered 
75 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 437.
76 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 438 .
77 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 465–66 (J. Johns, dissenting).
78 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 445 (J. Malcolm, concurring).
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in accordance with such canonical regulations as might from time to time 
be enacted concerning its incidences.79 Far from thwarting her intent, 
the application of the prescripts of the 1917 Code served it. Malcolm also 
remarked that the provision of the Organic Act cited by the Court of First 
Instance was at all events inapplicable to the case at hand, as the “law” of 
which it spoke was not the canon law of the Catholic Church, but rather 
the acts of the Philippine Commission, the Philippine Legislature, or the 
municipalities.80
Holding that the provisions of the 1917 Code determined the necessary 
qualifications for appointment to the chaplaincy in question, and that the 
Archbishop of Manila had formed his decision not to appoint Gonzalez 
as chaplain on this basis, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that 
Gonzalez was not legally entitled either to be appointed as chaplain or to 
collect incomes accruing to the chaplaincy. The judgment of the lower court 
was reversed and the Archbishop of Manila was absolved from the complaint. 
Not contented, Gonzalez appealed.
Litigation in the Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously upheld the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Louis Brandeis again rejected the Archbishop of Manila’s objection that 
secular courts lacked jurisdiction in the matter on account of its ecclesiastical 
nature, affirming that the courts indeed had not only jurisdiction of the 
parties—since the Archbishop of Manila was a juridic person at civil law, and 
therefore had standing both to sue and be sued in secular courts—but also of 
the subject matter, since the case fundamentally concerned Gonzalez’s alleged 
rights as the beneficiary of a trust.81 
The transfer of the chaplaincy property to the spiritual properties of the 
Archbishop affected the terms of this trust, attaching to its future use the 
implicit condition that it should be held and administered according to the 
rules and usages of the Roman Catholic Church. Since a trust had ordinarily 
to be executed in accordance with the settlor’s intent, even if only implicit, this 
condition entailed that the canons prescribing the qualifications of chaplains 
and establishing structures for judging the suitability of candidates had to 
79 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 445–47 (J. Malcolm, concurring).
80 Gonzalez, 51 Phil. 420 at 445 (J. Malcolm, concurring).
81 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 15–16.
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be given legal effect. This did not entail a total deference to ecclesiastical 
authorities, but only that “in the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, 
the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, 
although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular 
courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract 
or otherwise. Under like circumstances, effect is given in the courts to 
the determinations of the judicatory bodies established by clubs and civil 
organizations.”82 
Applying this principle to the case at hand, Brandeis noted the Court’s 
opinion that the canon law in force at the time of Gonzalez’s presentation 
rather than at the time of the chaplaincy’s erection determined the necessary 
qualifications for appointment.83 It was clear, he said, that the foundress did 
not intend her gift to be administered forever according to the canon law 
in force at the time of its erection, irrespective of any discretionary role for 
the Archbishop of Manila or future developments in canon law. Since the 
Archbishop appeared to have followed the controlling canon law without 
even the suggestion of arbitrariness, the Court was bound to accept his 
decision as conclusive.84 This entailed that Gonzalez had no legal right to 
be appointed as chaplain, and thus, that he had no legal right to an income 
from the chaplaincy, or to recover surplus incomes which had accrued during 
its vacancy.85
LEGACY
As noted above, Gonzalez stands within a broader jurisprudential 
movement, tending away from the resolution of church disputes through the 
use of more intrusive techniques which entangled secular courts in questions 
of religious doctrine and toward more deferential alternatives more amenable 
to a healthy separation of church and state. The case contributed to this 
movement both indirectly and directly. In the former sense, the possibility 
foreseen by Justice Brandeis for secular courts to review the decisions of 
religious judicatories in alleged cases of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness 
represented an exception to the rule of deference articulated in the earlier case 
82 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 16–17.
83 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 17.
84 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 18.
85 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 18–19.
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of Watson v. Jones, upon which Gonzalez was in part decided. Its subsequent 
rejection marked out a wider sphere of proper competence for religious 
judicatories. Gonzalez contributed directly to the development of American 
civil church law as a forerunner of the ministerial exception, the legal doctrine 
which “immunizes religious entities from discrimination suits brought by 
employees with ‘ministerial’ responsibilities such as teaching religious doctrine 
or leading worship.”86   
Contributions to Judicial Dispute Resolution Techniques
Antecedent Dispute Resolution Techniques
The earliest church disputes in the United States involved the diversion 
of property given in support of one creed or confession to that of another, 
through changes in denominational affiliation.87 In the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century, it was not always possible for religious dissenters to 
formally incorporate their congregations owing to the existence of established 
churches in many states.88 To secure their congregational property at civil 
law, these dissenters would often assign legal title to individual congregants 
as trustees. Few difficulties arose where this trust was express or where donors 
specified conditions of defeasance, in which cases the general doctrines of 
equity could be invoked in the courts to prevent the diversion of congregational 
property. More often, however, property was conveyed to trustees in fee simple 
absolute, making it harder to compel them to cease and desist when they were 
determined to change denominations.
To promote greater stability in religious matters and to prevent rebellious 
trustees from abusing their positions of authority, sometimes against the 
wishes of the majority of congregants, American courts developed the 
substantial departure test.89 Premised on the theory that “all gifts to religious 
purposes, whether they take the form of land, money, or services, whether they 
consist of the widow’s mite or the millionaire’s check . . . are charitable gifts 
encumbered with a trust which cannot be breached,” this technique required 
secular courts to inquire into the parties’ adherence to the doctrines of the 
86 Lupu and Tuttle, 57.
87 Zollmann, 143–44.
88 Zollmann, 40–42.
89 The English case of Attorney General v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353 (1817) provided the basis of 
this test.
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original donor.90 A party departing substantially from these doctrines would 
be recognized as violating (or attempting to violate) the terms of the implied 
trust attached to the congregational property, and thus to have forfeited its 
interest therein.
Despite its theoretical elegance, the substantial departure test was fraught 
with difficulties. First, secular courts were ill-equipped to investigate the 
questions of religious doctrine necessary to ascertain the faith of the original 
donors of church property.91 Second, the act of legally pronouncing one 
party to be faithful to those doctrines and another to be unfaithful violated 
the separation of church and state.92 Third, the substantial departure test 
excessively restricted the future uses of church property, stifling religious 
dynamism and running contrary to the American valorization of majority 
rule.93 And fourth, the substantial departure test failed to appreciate the 
fact that most American congregations drew support not from monolithic 
endowments, but from countless small offerings made by congregants and 
benefactors, not all of whom shared the same religious convictions as the 
beneficiaries of their kindness.94 Trying to infer the collective will of such a 
diverse group was farcical.
Though some vestiges of the substantial departure test can still be found 
in the decision of the Gonzalez court, the technique fell out of favor after 
the New York Court of Appeals developed an alternative dispute resolution 
technique in its decision in the 1854 case of Robertson v. Bullions.95 Here 
the Court creatively reinterpreted the state’s religious corporations’ statute 
as having incorporated not the trustees of congregational property, but the 
congregations themselves. This had the effect of concentrating the legal and 
equitable interests in this property in the whole membership, reducing the 
trustees to mere corporate directors who could be bound by the majority vote 
of the congregants. While arguably an improvement upon the substantial 
departure test, this majoritarian approach was seriously flawed in that it took 
a congregationalist polity as its template for resolving all church property 
disputes, even when the church in question had adopted clear hierarchical 
structures to provide for the internal resolution of such disputes.96 This 
90 Zollmann, 149.
91 Zollmann, 144, 150–53; see Watson, 80 U.S. 679 at 729.  
92 Lupu and Tuttle, 50–51.
93 Zollmann, 160–61.
94 Zollmann, 149, 159–60.
95 See Gonzalez, 5 Phil. 420 at 437.
96 Zollmann, 144–45.
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approach created serious problems for the Roman Catholic, Episcopalian, 
Lutheran, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches, among others, implying 
as it did that their ecclesiastical law would be given no probative value in 
disputes before secular courts. 
The Rule of Deference
It was in fact a dispute over the property of a Presbyterian congregation 
which brought about a much needed correction to the majoritarian approach. 
In the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that where property had been given expressly in trust for the promotion 
of specific doctrines, courts could inquire into the faith and practices of the 
litigants to see which adhered more closely to the will of the donor.97 In the 
absence of an express trust, courts were to take notice of denominational 
polity, following the will of the majority where a congregational polity 
obtained and deferring to the decisions of religious judicatories (such as 
synods, assemblies, or bishops) where a hierarchical polity obtained.98 This 
deference rested upon the secular legal status of religious organizations as 
voluntary associations, to whose governance their members consented as a 
condition of membership.99
Secular courts therefore recognized the competence of religious judicatories 
to resolve internal disputes among the members of a denomination. Their 
jurisdiction, however, was not recognized as extending to disputes between 
members and nonmembers, or among nonmembers, nor as entailing the right 
to judge criminal matters or impose penalties reserved to the secular courts, 
such as incarceration or capital punishment.100 Rather, religious judicatories 
were competent to pronounce sentence only “where a subject-matter of 
dispute [is] of a strictly and purely ecclesiastical character . . . a matter which 
concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, 
97 Watson, 80 U.S. 679 at 722–24.
98 Watson, 80 U.S. 679 at 726–27.
99 Watson, 80 U.S. 679 at 728–29: “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the 
support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.  The right to organize voluntary religious 
associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create 
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the 
ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the 
general association, is unquestioned.  All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an 
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.  But it would be a vain consent 
and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their 
decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.”
100 Watson, 80 U.S. 679 at 733.
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or the conformity of the members of the church to the standards of morality 
required of them.”101 Secular courts could not intervene in these areas without 
entangling themselves in the internal affairs of religious organizations, 
establishing certain of their doctrines or political forms, restricting their free 
exercise of religion, and violating their freedom of association.102
Indirect Contributions of Gonzalez
The Supreme Courts of the Philippines and of the United States decided 
Gonzalez on the basis of the Watson precedent, classifying determinations as 
to the qualifications of religious officers as a strictly and purely ecclesiastical 
matter in which the duly constituted religious judicatory (and not the secular 
courts) was competent to judge. This tended to favor the disentanglement of 
church and state, since it saved courts from having to investigate doctrinal 
questions outside their expertise while also respecting the right and the ability 
of religious groups to enact, interpret, and apply their own ecclesiastical laws. 
At the same moment, however, the possibility foreseen by Justice Brandeis for 
secular courts to review the decisions of religious judicatories for procedural 
correctness when these were challenged on the grounds of fraud, collusion, or 
arbitrariness represented an exception to the rule of deference—thus tending 
to favor a continuing entanglement of the courts in questions of church 
discipline and ecclesiastical government.
Subsequent church disputes decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States referred to this exception without ever explicating its content or putting 
it in application.103 Even so, some state courts did apply it in cases. In 1976, 
such a case came before the Supreme Court on appeal from the Supreme 
Court of Illinois, which had ruled that the governing body of the Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Church had failed to comply with its own procedures when 
it removed Bishop Dionisije Milivojevich from office, and had ordered his 
reinstatement. Without passing on whether it would be permissible for secular 
courts to review the decisions of religious judicatories for fraud or collusion, 
the Supreme Court of the United States explicitly rejected the possibility of 
their reviewing these decisions for arbitrariness:  
101 Watson, 80 U.S. 679 at 733.
102 Watson, 80 U.S. 679 at 733–34.
103 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115–16 (1952); Presbyterian Church 
v. Hull Memorial Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447, 450–51 (1969); Maryland and Virginia Churches 
v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369 n. 3, (1970).
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For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church 
judicatory are in that sense “arbitrary” must inherently entail inquiry into 
the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church 
judicatory to follow, or else in to the substantive criteria by which they are 
supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry 
that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would 
undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper 
subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical 
decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.104
Dissenting from the majority opinion, Justice William Rehnquist argued 
that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Watson and Gonzalez had understood 
of religious organizations as having the status of private associations, not 
dissimilar from any other sort of club or civic organization.105 Since courts 
could investigate whether these other organizations had followed their rules 
and procedures in expelling leaders or members, it should be possible for 
them to conduct a similar investigation with respect to churches. Ira Lupu 
and Robert Tuttle contend that “this objection misses the central point of 
Watson and Gonzalez. Although both decisions link treatment of religious and 
secular organizations, they also emphasize the distinctive quality of ‘purely 
ecclesiastical’ questions. Civil courts may be competent to make judgments 
about the purposes of secular organizations or the qualifications of leaders of 
such organizations, but civil courts may not make judgments about matters 
that are quintessentially religious.”106
Contributions to the Development of the Ministerial Exception
Gonzalez had a more significant legacy for the development of the 
ministerial exception to antidiscrimination legislation such as Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting employment discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.107 Though this legislation included 
an exception for religious employers, its applicability to clergy and other 
104 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); see 712–
20.
105 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. 696 at 728–30 (J. Rehnquist, dissenting); see 
Watson, 80 U.S. 679 at 714; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1 at 16–17.
106 Lupu and Tuttle, 56.
107 Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 703, codified at 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a) (1984); McClure 
v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ministerial employees was at first uncertain.108 In 1972, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals dispelled some of this uncertainty, holding in the case 
of McClure v. Salvation Army109 that “investigation into matters such as a 
minister’s salary, place of assignment, and duties would violate the separation 
of church and state contemplated by the First Amendment. It thus held 
that the application of Title VII to the employment relationship between a 
church and its minister, and judicial scrutiny of employment decisions, would 
constitute a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”110 
The Fifth Circuit Court cited Gonzalez in support of its conclusions, noting 
that it illustrated the principle that religious organizations should be free 
from secular interference in their internal affairs, including the selection of 
their ministers.
Other state and federal courts further developed the ministerial exception 
by devising tests for determining which employees were engaged in ministerial 
conduct and thus barred from filing discrimination suits against their 
employers. One test was quantitative in nature, classifying employees as 
ministerial or nonministerial on the basis of the proportion between their 
religious and nonreligious duties.111 Another test was qualitative in nature, 
examining the functions performed by employees and their importance to the 
employer’s religious mission.112 The latter test has since become the preferred 
technique used by American courts.113
While a considerable jurisprudence on the ministerial exception developed 
over the years, the precise constitutional basis of the exception and the full 
extent of its applicability were only fully clarified in 2012, when the Supreme 
Court of the United States ruled in the case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC. Here, the Court held that the ministerial 
exception rests upon the guarantees of both the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses, forasmuch as any attempt by secular authority to determine 
the qualifications and disqualifications of religious ministers entailed state 
sanction for some employment policies and not others, representing an 
108 Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 702, codified at 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-1(a) (1984).
109 McClure, 460 F.2d 553.
110 Kenneth B. Axe, “Who Is a Religious or Ministerial Employee?” Wisconsin Lawyer, 
December 2012, http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?
Volume=85&Issue=12&ArticleID=10528#10. 
111 Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 
(4th Cir. 1985).
112 Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 320 Wis. 2d 275 (2009).
113 Axe, “Who Is a Religious or Ministerial Employee?”
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intrusion by that authority into a strictly and purely ecclesiastical question 
which was fundamentally an internal matter for the religious body in 
question.114 The determination as to what constitutes a strictly and purely 
ecclesiastical question, however, is within the power of a secular court. As 
Lupu and Tuttle note, “Many aspects of the relationship between clergy and 
employers do not implicate ecclesiastical matters,” and some of these—such as 
liability for tortious conduct or even actions alleging breach of contract—are 
not necessarily precluded by the ministerial exception.115 If a court judges 
that its inquiry into a given matter would entangle it in considerations of 
doctrine or polity, it must refrain from inquiring; if no such danger presents 
itself, it may proceed.
The courts decided Gonzalez along similar lines of reasoning as were later 
used to articulate the ministerial exception. Here it will be helpful to recall 
that Gonzalez had alleged that his being the lawful heir of the chaplaincy’s 
foundress gave him an equitable interest in the chaplaincy property and thus 
an unqualified right to succeed to its directorship and to receive its incomes; 
but since the chaplaincy had been constituted as collative, for him to succeed 
to its directorship required the performance of canonical acts, namely, the 
conferral of minor orders and the issuance of an appropriate decree; therefore, 
Gonzalez posited that his property interests gave him a civil right, enforceable 
against the Archbishop of Manila, to receive ordination and be appointed to 
an ecclesiastical office. Although Gonzalez cited no antidiscrimination laws 
in support of his arguments, his allegation that the Archbishop had infringed 
his civil right by refusing to perform these canonical acts can be interpreted 
as a claim of age discrimination: in effect, he was being denied employment 
to which he was entitled under the original terms of the trust, owing to an 
unlawful retroactive alteration in these terms which specified a higher age 
for eligibility.
That Gonzalez sought ministerial employment is incontrovertible. 
Applying the quantitative test, one finds it clear that the primary duties of 
a chaplain are religious rather than secular in nature, the raison d’ être of a 
chaplaincy being the celebration of a certain number of Masses annually in 
accordance with the will of the founder. The management of the chaplaincy 
property is incidental and ancillary to this spiritual purpose, providing the 
officeholder with a means of support in order that the founder’s will might be 
114 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 704 
(2012).
115 Lupu and Tuttle, 60.
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actuated in perpetuity. Applying the qualitative test, one sees that the work of 
a chaplain is intimately connected with the religious mission of the Roman 
Catholic Church. This is evident not only as regards the kinds of duties 
incumbent upon chaplains but also as regards their qualifications, which, in 
respect of collative chaplaincies, include the reception of at least minor orders 
and training in philosophy and theology. 
Taking notice of these considerations, the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines held that determinations as to the qualifications of religious 
officers pertained to church governance and were therefore a strictly and 
purely ecclesiastical matter in which it had to defer to the judicatories of the 
Roman Catholic Church. Declining to apply the general doctrines of equity, it 
accepted the 1917 Code of Canon Law as the applicable canonical legislation 
and ruled that the Archbishop of Manila had applied his church’s internal law 
correctly; consequently, Gonzalez had no civil right to receive ordination or be 
named as chaplain. In short, the ministerial nature of the employment sought 
by Gonzalez necessitated that the courts make an exception in their application 
of property law so as to avoid entangling the state in religious affairs through 
the sanctioning of some religious employment practices and not others. This 
is substantially the same logic as that upon which the ministerial exception 
rests, though it should be recalled that current jurisprudence would regard 
the willingness of the Court to pass upon the procedural correctness of the 
Archbishop’s actions as already being an impermissible intrusion into the 
internal affairs of a religious organization. For this reason, Gonzalez represents 
a forerunner of the ministerial exception rather than its first exemplar.
CONCLUSION
Gonzalez was a hard case that made for good law. Its complexity was 
partly a result of the unique historical circumstances out of which the case 
arose, as well as the interplay of canonical and civil legal concepts. Using the 
dispute resolution technique known as the Deference Doctrine, the Supreme 
Courts of the Philippines and of the United States sifted the facts of the 
case and came to the conclusion that, since Gonzalez’s alleged rights as a 
beneficiary of a trust established by his ancestor were inextricably linked with 
his eligibility for an ecclesiastical office connected with the trust property, and 
since it belonged to the Roman Catholic Church to prescribe the qualifications 
for its ecclesiastical officers, Gonzalez’s canonical ineligibility to be appointed 
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chaplain entailed that he had neither equitable title to the trust property nor 
a right to its incomes.
The deference shown by the courts to the decisions of the Archbishop 
of Manila reflected the principles embodied in the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
This deference is situated within a broader movement in American 
jurisprudence, tending away from intrusive dispute resolution techniques, 
which entangled civil courts in questions of religious doctrine, and toward 
more deferential techniques, which better respect the separation of church 
and state.  Gonzalez contributed to this movement indirectly, in that the 
possibility for secular courts to review the decisions of religious judicatories 
when challenged on grounds of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness foreseen by 
Justice Brandeis in his decision was definitively rejected in the subsequent case 
of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich. This decision highlighted 
the distinction between religious organizations and other private associations, 
in turn marking out a wider sphere of competence for religious judicatories 
while limiting the ability of secular courts to overrule their decisions.
Gonzalez has also contributed directly to the development of American 
civil church law by setting a valuable precedent, according to which 
determinations as to the qualifications of religious ministers are held as 
a strictly and purely ecclesiastical matter which, in accordance with the 
rule of deference developed through cases such as Harmon v. Dreher and 
Watson v. Jones, is beyond the purview of secular courts. Such an analysis 
substantially agrees with the more recent concept of a “ministerial exception” 
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